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I. Introduction 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the globalized world to 
the international spread of infectious diseases. The first cases of Covid-19 were identified in 
Wuhan – the capital city of Hubei Province in the People’s Republic of China  (China or PRC) 
– in December 2019. At the time, nothing was known about the disease, and doctors were 
simply alarmed by the growing number of viral pneumonia cases of an unknown cause. The 
virus rapidly spread across mainland China and, within a matter of weeks, migrated to other 
countries in Asia, Western Europe and the United States.1 The outbreak was declared by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
on 30 January 2020 and a pandemic on 11 March 2020. As of 19 October 2020, there are 
more than 40 million registered cases and over 1.1 million of Covid-19-related deaths.2 Most 
of the researchers, however, agree that the officially registered cases represent only a fraction 
of the actual infections.3 The WHO estimates that up to 10% of the global population may 
have already contracted with the virus (although this estimate was based on unclear 
methodological grounds).4 At the same time, even the number of deaths is undercounted in 
many countries, as demonstrated by considerable excess mortality since the beginning of the 
pandemic, in excess of expected mortality as well as the number of officially registered 
Covid-19 deaths.5 
                                                             
 Dr. Tamás Hoffmann is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Centre for Social 
Sciences and an Associate Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest. Łukasz Gruszczyński is an A s sociate 
Professor at Kozminski University and Guest Researcher at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Centre for 
Social Sciences. Dr. Péter Marton is an Associate Professor at Corvinus University o f Budapest. Kés zült „A  
magyar jogrendszer reakcióképessége 2010 és 2018 között (FK 129018)” OTKA-kutatás TK által is támogatot t 
„Epidemiológia és jogtudomány” című projektje keretében. 
1 For the overview of the initial phase of the pandemic see C.Raina MacIntyre, ‘Global Spread of COVID-19 and 
Pandemic Potential’ (2020) 1(3) Global Biosecurity pp. 1-3. 
2 The up-date statistical data are available in the Coronavirus Resource Centre maintained by the Johns Hopkins 
University of Medicine (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu). 
3 See e.g. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Coronavirus Disease 2019 ( Covid -19). Commercial 
Laboratory Seroprevalence Surveys (3 October 2020), available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/cases-updates/commercial-lab-surveys.html (accessed 18 October 2020) 
4 Coronavirus: WHO estimates 10% of global population infected with COVID-19, DW, 5 October 2020, 
available at: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-who-estimates-10-of-global-population-infected-with-covid -
19/a-55162783 (accessed 18 October 2020). 
5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Excess Deaths Associated with COVID-19, by Age and Race and 
Ethnicity — United States, January 26–October 3, 2020. (23 October 2020), available at 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6942e2.htm (accessed 23 October 2020). 
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The above developments naturally beg the question of whether any State should face 
international legal responsibility for not taking timely and effective measures to prevent the 
cross-border spread of a lethal pathogen. This issue is the central question of this text. In order 
to answer it, the article proceeds as following: Section II summarizes the underlying rationale 
of preventing diseases; it then recapitulates, in Section III, the most relevant general rules of 
international law relating to state responsibility, the pertinent norms of the WHO International 
Health Regulations (IHR), and other applicable rules of international law. Finally, the article 
concludes in Section IV by briefly summarizing how these rules might apply to the PRC – the 
country that remains at the centre of the current pandemic, even if the number of its domestic 
cases is currently very low. 
 
II. International Disease Prevention Implies Actions to Avoid Triggering Kill Chains 
 
This section provides an overview of the chains of causation that can — in the context of a 
pandemic and independently of the actions of the government of the country whose citizens 
stand to suffer harm — lead to unintended but foreseeable harm to health (including loss of 
life) beyond the borders of the country at the chain stem; with the chains originating partly or 
wholly from the actions of the government of the country at the source. In short, we shall refer 
to these chains of causation as “kill chains.” 
Kill chains can arise fully intentionally, as evidenced by international and transnational 
armed conflicts worldwide. It is thus worth reiterating that the mechanisms of harm discussed 
below are only some of the possible ways of causing harm to health — ones exerting an effect 
across borders, unintentionally but foreseeably, and specifically in the context of epidemics. 
Ethical responsibility, just as the spectrum of imaginable, unintentionally but foreseeably 
harmful actions, is context-dependent. It manifests differently before and after international 
spread occurs; before and after governments take steps to restrict movement across borders; 
and before and after a working vaccine becomes available. Failing to notify the WHO and 
other States about an evolving situation of public health concern with potential international 
implications gives rise to kill chains through a deficit of preparedness which extends beyond 
governments — that thus do not have a chance to consider restrictive and other measures in 
protection of their citizens — to medical staff unaware that an epidemic is underway and that 
there are signs and symptoms to look out for, thus posing a risk to health personnel. It also 
results in a deficit of vigilance on the part of international travellers visiting the affected areas. 
In the context of free or only partially restricted movement across borders, the lack of 
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transparency concerning case numbers and the territorial distribution of cases along with other 
significant epidemic data may similarly result in a deficit of preparedness and vigilance. Once 
a vaccine becomes available, the failure to fully cooperate with the global effort to carry out a 
comprehensive campaign of vaccination could impede or render impossible disease 
eradication, thus imposing indirect responsibility (at least in an ethical sense) for all of the 
harm related to the continuation of the epidemic beyond the vaccine-availability baseline.  
Variables mediating the extent and scope of ethical responsibility include capacities and 
resources on the part of the governments concerned, as well as the specific characteristics of 
the infectious pathogen causing the pandemic. Capacities and resources may be self-evidently 
lacking in poor countries that already suffer from complex humanitarian emergencies, i.e., a 
combination of humanitarian crises and armed conflict and/or the aftermath of natural 
disaster(s).  
The specific properties of different pathogens have a profound impact on the containment 
strategy to be employed. SARS-CoV-2 is particularly difficult to contain. Its transmission 
often results from pre-symptomatic or asymptomatic carriers via a mixture of droplets and 
aerosols. To identify infected persons poses great challenges due to the imperfect sensitivity 
and specificity of test results. Outward signs and symptoms are difficult to recognize as these 
are mostly non-specific.6 Mortality is unevenly distributed across age groups and is mediated 
by specific co-morbidities (pre-existing chronic health conditions). This is already leading to 
visible signs of the lack of sufficient societal solidarity, even as hospitalizations affect a large 
— potentially, in places, overwhelmingly large — number of people of all ages. The 
treatment of hospitalized individuals is varied, complex and, in any case, demanding, posing a 
risk to health personnel. Lasting health damage (e.g., pulmonary, cardiac, vascular, renal and 
neurological damage) has been observed in a significant number of recovered patients, 
including conditions requiring lasting treatment (e.g., dialysis).  
Even with full commitment to identify all possibly infected persons (and their contacts), to 
isolate as well as test them, and, if necessary, to treat them from as early on as possible, 
perfect outcomes may not be attained. Major non-pharmaceutical interventions may be 
required to reduce the number of contacts and the possibility of exposure in general society, to 
slow down and eventually halt community spread. These intervention measures carry 
potentially very high economic costs as well as disruptive effects to health care services that 
may become inaccessible as a result of the epidemic. The measures in question may carry 
                                                             
6 More specific symptoms such as anosmia (loss of smell) do not consistently manifest in all cases. 
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major political costs, too, if they do not enjoy sufficient public support; with varying social 
costs if the measures encounter resistance and enforcement action follows. 
What is necessary, as well as what is possible under such circumstances will thus differ 
from what is required in fighting a pathogen that can be effectively treated (e.g., bubonic 
plague, if identified); is insect-borne and thus differently transmitted (e.g., the mosquito-borne 
West Nile Virus); is more unlikely to be transmitted in the pre-symptomatic stage and renders 
patients largely immobile in the symptomatic stage (e.g., Ebola Virus); is overall difficult to 
transmit from person to person (e.g., anthrax); presents with more obvious signs, symptoms 
and prevalence patterns (e.g., cholera) or more specific symptoms (e.g., measles). 
In the case of SARS-CoV-2, certain standards of expectation may nonetheless be set. At a 
minimum, countries are required to (1) coordinate their efforts with a view to commonly 
accepted goals, and, per consequence, to not undermine others’ efforts at trying to contain the 
threat; (2) to provide assistance to each other to share the burden of the implications of the 
necessary interventions, e.g., the economic costs, and to globally coordinate and optimally 
allocate the availability of scarce goods, such as medications, medical equipment, or 
(prospectively) vaccines; (3) be transparent, and, per consequence, to not actively impede the 
public availability of epidemic data; (4) do what capacities and resources permit them to do in 
terms of testing, contact-tracing and isolating infected persons in their respective territory.  
The failure to do any or all of the above gives rise to kill chains by resulting in in-bound 
and out-bound travellers’ deficit of vigilance, destination country governments’ deficit of 
preparedness, and shortages of key medications and medical equipment or the inadequate 
availability thereof in relation to dynamically shifting demand, as well as, overall, it elongates 
the reach of pandemic-related kill chains in space and time. 
Unfortunately, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, a considerable number of 
countries have engaged, or are still engaging at the time of writing this article, in some or all 
of the bad practices implied above, i.e., demonstrating no interest in internationally 
coordinating steps against the pandemic, not providing assistance within their means to others 
in need, not being sufficiently transparent or actively seeking to hide information from the 
public, and/or not being interested in tracing case contacts and in testing all persons showing 
possible signs and symptoms of COVID-19 disease. 
 
III. Rules of State Responsibility for the Failure to Prevent Pandemics  
III.1. General Rules 
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Under public international law, States can be held responsible for their internationally 
wrongful acts. A State commits an internationally wrongful act when its action or inaction 
(omission) constitutes a breach of its international obligations (such as those which are 
included in the IHR) and if they can be attributed to that State. However, the responsibility of 
a State may only arise if there is an injury to another State and if one can establish a causal 
link between the internationally wrongful act and such an injury. The latter is understood as a 
requirement of a clear causal chain that is foreseeable by a State that is potentially 
responsible.7  
Having said this, it also needs to be added that there might be circumstances that will 
preclude the wrongfulness of an act of a State. This may include grounds such as force 
majeur, state of necessity or distress.8 For example, force majeur relates to material 
impossibility of performance of international obligations due to occurrence of an irresistible 
force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State.  If responsibility is 
established, a State is required to make full reparation for the injury caused by its 
internationally wrongful act. These general rules of customary international law are codified 
and further elaborated in the draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC).9 According 
to this document, an action or omission can be attributed to a State only when it is committed 
by a State organ (or when a person or entity is acting as an agent of the State and exercising 
elements of governmental authority). However, this notion also includes actions and omission 
of non-central public bodies that are only partially controlled by the government (e.g. local 
authorities).10  
An injury as such is understood broadly as any damage, irrespectively of whether it is 
of material (e.g. economic or related to harm to the health of the relevant population) or moral 
character.11 At the same time, there is no requirement to show a “fault” on the side of a State 
concerned (i.e. intention to harm other States). In addition, it should be bear in mind that 
lawfulness of the action or inaction under domestic law, does not affect the qualification of 
                                                             
7 See James Crawford, State Responsibility – The General Part (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
8 For more detailed discussion see Federica Paddeu, Freya Jephcott, COVID-19 and Defences in the Law of State 
Responsibility: Part I, EJIL Talk!, (17 March 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-
of-state-responsibility-part-i/ (accessed 18 October 2020).  
9 International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), draft 
annexed to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and corrected by UN Doc. A /56/49(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4. 
10 Ibid., Art. 4. 
11 Ibid., Art. 31. 
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the act under international law.12 Unfortunately, the ARSIWA does not explain how the 
responsibility is to be allocated in situation where there are multiple state actors responsible 
for wrongdoing.13 Although the document prepared by the ILC has never been formally 
accepted by States as a binding instrument (e.g. in the form of an international convention), it 
is widely seen as a reflection of rules of customary international law that in principle is 
applicable to all States.14 Its rules are also widely referred to by international courts, tribunals 
and quasi-judicial bodies.  
 
III.2. State Responsibility under the WHO’s IHR 
 
The WHO is the United Nations’ specialized agency responsible for international public 
health. Its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), is entitled to adopt 
regulations concerning “sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed 
to prevent the international spread of disease”.15 These regulations do not require ratification 
but automatically enter into force and become binding on all Member States, except those that 
choose to formally opt-out. This approach is based on the realization that global health 
security requires both sound public health systems and a well-coordinated international 
network of information, surveillance, and response.16 
The first such regulation was created in 1951, when the WHA adopted the International 
Sanitary Regulations (ISR) aiming “to ensure the maximum security against the international 
spread of disease with minimum interference with world traffic”,17 covering six diseases — 
cholera, plague, epidemic (louse-borne) typhus, relapsing fever, smallpox, and yellow fever 
— whose outbreak had to be reported to the WHO by the national authorities. The ISR had a 
limited scope as it only applied to the listed reportable diseases and only required minor 
commitments from member states of the World Health Organization as its most important 
                                                             
12 Ibid., Art. 32. 
13 International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 42–43 (2001), pp. 124–25. 
14 James R. Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’, in Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law  (2006), 
available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1093 
(accessed 18 October 2020). 
15 Art. 21 of the WHO Constitution. 
16 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Harvard University Press, 2014) p. 175.  
17 Fidler points out that ”the development of international governance on infectious diseases… reflected the non-
intervention principle of the Westphalian system. The regime’s focus was on the management of state 
interactions – trade and travel – not on the public health conditions and problems that existed within the 
sovereign territories of states… This non-interventionary approach held even when governments knew that the 
trade frictions created by germs could be mitigated by reducing infectious disease problems before the pathogens 
spread to other countries.” David Fidler, SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease  (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2004) pp. 29-30. 
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goal was to control pandemics “with minimum interference with world traffic”. Even though 
in 1969 the ISR was renamed to International Health Regulations (IHR), its scope of 
application kept shrinking as the World Health Assembly first excluded louse-borne typhus 
and relapsing fever from its remit, then in 1981 the smallpox, in view of its global eradication. 
Eventually the IHR only applied to cholera, plague, and yellow fever.  
The fragility of the regulation, however, was spectacularly revealed by two major 
outbreaks: in 2003, the appearance of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in China, 
followed by a novel strain of pathogenic Influenza A (H5N1) in Thailand in 2004. In both 
cases, effective international cooperation was initially lacking as the national authorities did 
not report the emergence of these new viruses, enabling them to spread across borders. It 
became undeniable that the Regulations’ framework was inefficient to handle the international 
spread of diseases.18 Consequently, the international community decided to completely 
overhaul the IHR. 
In 2005, the WHA adopted the revision of the IHR that included major modifications. 
Most importantly, Art. 2 stated that the IHR’s purpose is “the protection of all people of the 
world from the international spread of disease”, i.e. the Regulations became applicable to 
every disease that could pose an international risk, and States Parties have an obligation to 
immediately notify the WHO of unexpected or unusual public health events that seem serious 
enough to constitute a public health emergency of international concern (Arts. 6-7). Such 
public health events include anything that “(1) has a serious public health impact; (2) is 
unusual or unexpected; (3) might be internationally virulent; and (4) is likely to trigger a 
significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions”.19 Moreover, States Parties have 
the obligation to develop certain minimum core public health capacities20 and establish 
National IHR Focal Points and WHO IHR Contact Points for urgent communications between 
States Parties and WHO (Art. 4). These obligations, however, are focusing on preparing for 
the outbreak of diseases instead of prevention. 
Based on the available information, the Director-General of the WHO has to determine 
whether the event reported by a state constitutes a public health emergency of international 
                                                             
18 David P. Fidler, Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘The New International Health Regulations: An Historic Development  
for International Law and Public Health’ (2006) 34(1) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics p. 85.  
19 Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘International Governance of Global Health Pandemics’ (2020) 24(3) ASIL Insights p. 2. 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/3/international-governance-global-health-pandemics (accessed 10 
September 2020).  
20 The core capacity requirements for surveillance and response are set forth in Annex 1 o f the In ternational 
Health Regulations. These requirements, however, are predominantly procedural in nature, ensuring that the state 
is able to determine the existence of an outbreak. Still, A.4(c) calls for the immediate implementation of 
preliminary control measures in such situations. 
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concern (PHEIC) (Art. 12) and in such cases health measures must be initiated and completed 
without delay based on scientific principles and the available scientific evidence of risk to 
health (Art. 43). While states are under a legal obligation to implement appropriate health 
measures, these are ultimately decided by the states themselves. The Director-General can 
only issue non-binding, temporary recommendations (Art. 15) or even standing 
recommendations for the states to act in such situations (Art. 16). The WHO might 
recommend various measures including the implementation of quarantine or other health 
measures or denying entry to suspect or affected persons (Art. 18). While proclamations of 
PHEICs have been criticized in the past for being premature or unjustified and thus having 
grave economic and political consequences,21 States might disregard these recommendations 
if they consider them too intrusive and the prevention of the international spread of disease 
can be achieved through other means. Yet, these different health measures should still 
“achieve the same or greater level of health protection than WHO recommendations” (Art. 
43(a)). Coupled with the fact that the IHR only call for States to collaborate and assist each 
other “to the extent possible” (Art. 44) in reacting to serious public health events, and that it 
grants no enforcement powers to the WHO, it is easy to see that establishing state 
responsibility for the violation of the IHR is extremely difficult when the international 
community faces a novel public health threat, in the absence of scientific consensus 
considering the best ways to counter the spread of a hitherto unknown virus.22  
 
III. 3. State Responsibility under Other Rules of International Law  
 
Customary international law acknowledges that it is the duty of each state ‘not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’.23 This means 
that states have to act with due diligence to try to prevent any significant transboundary harm 
originating from their territories. However, while this obligation of acting with due care is an 
objective standard, its application is inevitably context-dependent, as different countries have 
differing social and economic conditions that result in different available resources and 
                                                             
21 José E. Alvarez, ‘The WHO in the Age of Coronavirus’ (2020) 114(4) American Journal of International Law 
p. 584.  
22 Indeed, the fact the IHR wants to ensure that international travel and trad e remains as little affected by 
restrictions as possible could arguably contribute to the spread of pandemics. 
23 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v . 
Albania), 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22. See also the Pulp Mills case, where the Court held that “a State 
is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territo ry , o r 
in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage”. International Court of Justice, Pulp Mills  on  the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20 April 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, para. 101.  
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opportunities to act.24 Moreover, states are not obligated to absolutely prevent the harm but to 
attempt to do so, or to exert their ‘best possible efforts to minimize the risk’.25   
Beyond the general no-harm principle, specific branches of public international law 
create particular obligations. The right to life enshrined in Art. 6 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights26 necessarily requires States to adopt positive measures ‘to 
address the general conditions in society that may give rise to direct threats to life or prevent 
individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity’, including life-threatening 
diseases.27 Similarly, Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,28 protecting the right to health, obligates States parties to take steps for the 
‘prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases’ and 
create conditions to assure ‘medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’.29 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized that this obligation 
includes ‘the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics and 
similar health hazards, and the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in 
emergency situations’ and ‘States’ individual and joint efforts to, inter alia, make available 
relevant technologies, using and improving epidemiological surveillance and data collection 
on a disaggregated basis, the implementation or enhancement of immunization programmes 
and other strategies of infectious disease control’.30 In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
the Committee even pointed out that ”States have extraterritorial obligations related to global 
efforts to combat COVID-19.”31 
Leaving aside the problem of the enforcement of the above identified international 
rules, all those standards have important legal limitations (e.g. in terms of their scope or 
                                                             
24 Joanna Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law (Brill Nijhoff, 2016) p. 263.    
25 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with Commentaries (2001) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II. p. 154. It  migh t  
be argued that this principle derives from the principle of sovereign equality of states. See Jut ta Brunnée, ‘Sic 
Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas ’, in Max Planck Encyclopaedias of Public International Law (2010), para. 8. 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1607 (accessed 19 
October 2020).  
26 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United  
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 
27 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6 – Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36. 
para. 26.  
28 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. 
29 The WHO Constitution also explicitly acknowledges the right to health in its Preamble, providing  that “The 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights o f every  human being  
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.” 
30 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4. para. 16.  
31 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , Statement on the Coronavirus Disease ( COVID-19)  
Pandemic and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2020/1 para. 20.  
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applicable thresholds), making it difficult to hold States responsible for the outbreak and 
spread of the virus. In this context, it should also be noted that international state 
responsibility can only be determined at the international level, either in the course of the 
proceeding in the International Court of Justice (e.g. on the basis of Art. 75 of the WHO 
Constitution),32 or at some other international court that enjoys jurisdiction, initiated by states 
that have suffered injury. Such determination is not possible in front of national courts of an 
injured country, as states enjoy immunity pursuant to the general principle of international 
law of ‘par in parem non habet jurisdictionem’33. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
An international pandemic is supposed to be the par excellence example of a situation 
warranting global cooperation, and each country should act swiftly and effectively to prevent 
the further spread of the virus as it can cause harm to health in other countries’ populations as 
well. However, as explained in Section III, establishing state responsibility under the general 
and special rules of international law is extremely difficult as the reaction to a novel health 
hazard in the absence of scientific consensus regarding the best way to suppress the virus 
inevitably leads to different strategies adopted by different countries. Indeed, even the WHO 
has changed its recommendations concerning the wearing of face masks by healthy 
                                                             
32 Article 75 provides: “Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Constitut ion 
which is not settled by negotiation or by the Health Assembly shall be referred to  the In ternat ional Court  o f 
Justice ….” On the possibility to use this avenue to bring the PRC to the International Court of Justice see Peter 
Tzeng, ‘Taking China to the International Court of Justice over Covid-19’, EJIL-TALK! (4 February 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-china-to-the-international-court-of-justice-over-covid-19/ (accessed 20 October 
2020).  
33 ‘Equals have no sovereignty over each other’. See e.g. International Court of Justice, Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p . 99. However, the 
Attorney General of the US state of Missouri filed a lawsuit on 21 April 2020 against various Chinese agencies 
to recover “”the enormous loss of life, human suffering, and economic turmoil experienced by all Mis s ourians 
from the COVID-19 pandemic that has disrupted the entire world.” See The State of Missouri v . The People’s 
Republic of China, The Communist Party of China, National Health Commission of The People’s Republ ic o f 
China, Ministry of Emergency Management of The People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Civil Affairs o f The 
People’s Republic of China, People’s Government of Hubei Province, People’s Government o f Wuhan  Ci ty, 
Wuhan Institute of Virology, and Chinese Academy of Sciences, (United States District Court fo r the Eas tern  
District of Missouri Southeastern Division). https://ago.mo.gov/docs/default-source/press-releases/2019/prc -
complaint.pdf?sfvrsn=86ae7ab_2 (accessed 19 October 2020). See further Chimène I. Keitner, ‘To Litigate a 
Pandemic: Cases in the United States Against China and the Chinese Communist Party and Foreign  Sovereign 
Immunities’ (2020) 19(2) Chinese Journal of International Law pp. 229-236.  
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individuals between April and June 2020.34 The same is true for its travel advice for the 
Wuhan region.35 
In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, most discussions concerned the responsibility 
of the PRC, but the responsibility of other States for different actions or inactions, taken 
during the pandemic, cannot be excluded either (e.g. when countries have not implemented 
required restrictions or have not done this in a timely manner leading to the spread of the 
disease outside their territory). As far as the PRC is concerned, one may think about various 
alleged failures of that country in handling the pandemic in its early phase. In this context, it 
is submitted that China tolerated for years the functioning of so-called wet markets — with 
very poor or no supervision even though the SARS outbreak was already linked to them36 — 
as well as that it initially suppressed the information about the outbreak of the new disease,37 
did not undertake necessary actions to contain it, did not immediately disclose the information 
about possible human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and delayed reporting the 
outbreak to the WHO. For some time, China was also reluctant to admit the official field 
mission of the organization to the city of Wuhan. There also researchers who claim, on the 
basis of indirect evidence, that information about the number of infections was suppressed 
also at the later stages of the local epidemic (from February to March 2020), thereby creating 
a false picture of the severity of the Covid-19 outbreak.38 The proponents of this narrative 
argue that all these mismanagements have contributed to a wider spread of the disease, not 
only in the territory of China but also beyond its borders, eventually leading to the current 
global pandemic. 
Applying the relevant rules of international law to the actions taken by the PRC in the 
context of the Covid-19 pandemic, in order to establish its international responsibility, is not 
                                                             
34 World Health Organization, Advice on the Use of Masks in the Context of COVID-19: In terim Guidance, 6  
April 2020.; Advice on the Use of Masks in the Context of COVID-19: Interim Guidance, 5 June 2020 (accessed 
18 October 2020).  
35 World Health Organization, Advice for International Travel and Trade in Relation to the Outbreak of 
Pneumonia Caused by a New Coronavirus in China, 10 January 2020, https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-
detail/who-advice-for-international-travel-and-trade-in-relation-to-the-outbreak-of-pneumonia-caused-by-a-new-
coronavirus-in-china (accessed 18 October 2020). 
36 Robert G. Webster, ‘Wet Markets—A Continuing Source of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and 
Influenza?’ Lancet (17 January 2004) 363(9404) pp. 234–236.  
37 H Davidson, ‘Chinese Inquiry Exonerates Coronavirus Whistleblower Doctor’ The Guardian (20 March 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/chinese-inquiry-exonerates-coronavirus-whistleblower-
doctor-li-wenliang> (accessed 18 October 2020). 
38 Mai He, Li Li, Louis P Dehner, Lucia Dunn, ‘Cremation Based Estimates Suggest Significant Under- and Delayed 
Reporting of COVID-19 Epidemic Data in Wuhan and China’, medRxiv 2020.05.28.20116012; doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.28.20116012 (accessed 18 October 2020). 
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an easy task.39 The first problem concerns determination of the pertinent facts, many of which 
still remain obscure and might never be ascertained (e.g. as to the origin of the virus). Second, 
it may be also difficult to establish a causal relationship between the specific injury (e.g. loss 
of lives or economic damage) and the mishandling of the health crisis by a specific country.40 
In this context, it should be noted that most of the developed countries affected by the virus 
stayed idle even after it became clear that SARS-CoV-2 is easily transmissible between 
humans (and after numerous warnings issued by the WHO). Therefore, it is unclear whether 
the injury should be deemed a result of their (in)actions or if it can be attributed to other 
countries, such as the PRC. Third, one has to also identify specific applicable international 
legal obligations that have been potentially violated. The most relevant legal framework that 
should be looked at is provided in the revised IHR. In this context, particularly important are 
provisions of Arts. 6-7, which call for immediate notification of the WHO in case of an event 
that seems serious enough to constitute a public health emergency of international concern. 
Still, as seen above, the IHR does not clarify the substantive content of States’ obligations, 
which makes the determination of their responsibility very difficult beyond the potential 
breach of this procedural obligation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
39 Those difficulties predate the Covid-19 pandemic, see Matiangai Sirleaf, ‘Responsibility for Epidemics ’ 
(2018-2019) 97(2) Texas Law Review pp. 285-351.   
40 David P. Fidler, ‘COVID-19 and International Law: Must China Compensate Countries for the Damage?’ Just 
Security (27 March 2020) https://www.justsecurity.org/69394/covid-19-and-international-law-must-china-
compensate-countries-for-the-damage-international-health-regulations/ (accessed 22 October 2020).  
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